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CASE COMMENT
FRANCHISE AGREEMENTS AND ADJUDICATION IN THE
UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
James W. Kirkconnelr
I. INTRODUCTION

Franchise relationships can lead to anti-competitive behavior.
Franchising allows a party (or franchisee) to contract with another party (a
franchisor) and thereby exploit the franchisor's products, trademark,
reputation, and good will. In return, the franchisee must acquiesce to the
quality standards and purchasing restrictions necessary to maintain the
franchisor's reputation and proven business model.1 This system has
several benefits. It allows a firm to expand its business without risking
capital, and at the same time it provides a successful business model and
eases market entry for investors.2 Problems arise when franchisors impose
upon franchisees conditions that could not be sustained in a competitive
market, particularly when there is no corresponding benefit to a
franchisor's reputation.3 Because of sunk costs and a contractual
relationship, franchisees often cannot avoid these franchisor abuses.4

*

J.D., University of Florida, Levin College of Law, 2006.

1. TREATY ESTABUSHING THE EUROPEAN CoMMuNrrY, Dec. 24, 2002, 2002 O.J. (C 325)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Commission Regulation No. 4087/88 of30 Nov. 1988 on the Application
of Article 85 (3) of the Treaty to Categories of Franchise Agreements, 1988 O.J. (L 359) 49-52
[hereinafter Commission Regulation No. 4087/88] (outlining the benefits of the franchise). For a
discussion on the benefits provided by franchising, see Warren S. Grimes, When Do Franchisors
Opportunism,65 ANTITRUST L.J. 105,107have MarketPower?AntitrustRemediesforFranchisor
12, 123-26 (1996).
2. Franchising also allows a franchisor to benefit from the loyalty inspired by ownership of
the franchise by the franchisee. See Grimes, supranote 1, at 107-08.
3. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 464-65 (1992)
(describing consumers' inability to look elsewhere for repair services). Commission Regulation No.
4087/88, supra note 1. This is the underlying assumption of Article 85's balancing of interests.
Warren S. Grimes, MarketDefinitionin FranchiseAntitrust Claims:RelationalMarketPowerand
the Franchisor'sConflict oflnterest,67 ANTITRUST L.J. 243 (1999) (discussing how the franchise
relationship locks-in franchisees).

4. Kodak,504 U.S. at 464,475-78 (discussing how Kodak locked-in customers through high
switching costs and the absence of life cycle pricing). Grimes, supra note 3, at 247, 250-53
(outlining three sources of relational market power: sunk costs, fear of retribution, and desire for
favorable franchisor treatment).
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The European Union has sought to prevent these abuses through
legislation.5 The EU proscribes franchise agreements that enable a
franchisor to impose anti-competitive conditions upon franchisees if
franchisors are unable to show that such restrictions are necessary to
protect good will.6 The Supreme Court of the United States adopted a
similar standard in EastmanKodak v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S.

451 (1992).' However, since that decision several circuit courts have
adopted a narrow reading of that holding.' These decisions lack the procompetitive justifications that underlie the EU regulations and allow for
franchisors
to routinely abuse franchisees through relational market
9
power.

II. BACKGROUND

Market power can only exist in a post-contractual relationship if a firm
can impose conditions, like supra-competitive prices or decreased output,
upon consumers that it could not otherwise impose in a competitive
market. One way a firm does this is by changing its policies and
requirements once it has locked-in franchise investors through franchise
agreements. Since franchisees are effectively locked into the franchise
relationship, franchisors have relational market power over franchisees.'"
There is a fundamental difference between the approaches of the United
States and the European Union to franchise agreements. The United States
tends to disregard relational market power and instead relies on a showing
of specific behaviors and contractual remedies, and in so doing deemphasizes empirical evidence of competitive harm." On the other hand,
5. EEC Treaty art. 85; Commission Regulation No. 4087/88, supra note 1.
6. Commission Regulation No. 4087/88, supra note 1.
7. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 461 (stating Kodak's justifications for its policies).
8. SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir. 1999)
(stating that Kodak stands for the idea that a primary market may not discipline an aftermarket); PSI
Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811, 819 (6th Cir. 1997) (requiring plaintiffs show
a change in policy to trigger antitrust violations); Queens City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc.,
124 F.3d 430, 441 (3d Cir. 1997) (holding that disclosure of pricing scheme removed case from
antitrust inquiry); Digital Equip. Corp. v. Uniq Digital Techs., 73 F.3d 756,762-63 (7th Cir. 1996)
(finding no relational market power). But see Virtual Maint., Inc. v. Prime Computer, Inc., 11 F.3d
660 (9th Cir. 1994) (upholding aKodaktype lock-in claim); Red Lion Med. Safety, Inc. v. Ohmeda,
Inc., 63 F. Supp. 2d 1218 (E.D. Cal. 1999) (stating that a change in policy is not necessary to
withstand summary judgment).
9. EEC Treaty art. 85.
10. Grimes, supra note 3, at 247, 250-53.
11. David A.J. Goldfine &Kenneth M. Vorrasi, TheFall oftheKodakAftermarketDoctrine
Dying a Slow Death in the Lower Courts, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 209 (2004). The authors describe the
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the European Union dictates at the outset, the limitations of franchise
agreements, and thus it recognizes the
negative potential that such
2
relationships may have on competition.
Although Kodak dealt with a durable goods aftermarket, it stands as the
leading case in the United States for analyzing franchise disputes.' 3 Longterm business ventures, such as franchising agreements, resemble the
purchase of durable goods in that both establish long-term commercial
relationships. Accordingly, changing post-sale policy by raising prices for
copier parts is analogous to a franchisor unilaterally changing the terms of
a franchise agreement. Both are an exertion of market power in a post-sale
or post-contract context, where the relevant market is defined by the4
substitutes available to copier purchasers or franchisees, respectively.'
However, franchisors may undertake these abuses in the United States
without fear of antitrust liability.
A footnote in Kodak, addressed to the dissent, implied that if primary
market consumers knew or if Kodak divulged accurate life cycle pricing,
then an antitrust claim should fail.15 Under this approach, informed
consumers would buy photocopiers from the most efficient companies
according to the cost of a photocopier throughout its useful life, and any
aftermarket shenanigans would eventually damage Kodak's primary
market sales for photocopiers. 6 This logic is the foundation of most circuit
courts' subsequent interpretation of Kodak. 7 In adopting this view, the
circuit courts assume that post contractual market power is unlikely, given
that the damage that franchisor abuses would do to the franchisor's
reputation in the primary market for franchise investors.'"

current three-part test most circuit courts use to establish antitrust liability for lock-in plaintiffs: 1Lack of availability of life cycle pricing; 2- High switching costs; and 3- A post-sale change in
policy.
12. EEC Treaty art. 85; Commission Regulation No. 4087/88, supra note 1. By its very
passage, Article 85 indicates that the European Economic Community recognizes the potential for
abuse in franchise relationships.
13. See generally,SMS, 188 F.3d at II (citing Kodak, 504 U.S. at 451); PSI, 104 F.3d at 811
(citing Kodak, 504 U.S. at 451); Goldfine & Vorrasi, supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., Kodak, 504 U.S. at 469-70 n. 15.
15. Id. at 477 n.24.
16. Id. at 492 (describing how knowledge ofKodak's parts policy, ifpossessed by purchasers,
would absolve Kodak of antitrust liability).
17. Goldfine & Vorrasi, supranote 11.
18. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 492-93.
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III. ANALYSIS
Information barriers help define markets, especially in the context of
durable goods and long-term contractual relationships. Without
information regarding aftermarket transactions or post-contractual policies,
consumers are unable to shop efficiently. 9 This lack of knowledge
prevents customers from finding reasonable substitutes for goods.2
Furthermore, without adequate information costs, or because of
disinformation from some firms, customers may disregard potential
substitutes as reasonably interchangeable alternatives.2
Accurate life cycle information, when possessed by consumers,
therefore merges the primary and after markets into a single primary
market: post-sale costs would be accounted for by consumers in primary
market transactions.22 In such a situation, if a firm does not have market
power in the primary market, then market power in the after market is
impossible because, at least in theory, there is no aftermarket. In the
franchising context, courts often view fianchisor behavior that exploits a
franchisee's inability to look elsewhere for supplies (because of fear of
retribution or because of sunk costs23 ) as merely the exercise of contractual
freedoms, and not as anti-competitive harm.24
Accordingly, several federal courts now require that a plaintiff in a
lock-in antitrust claim offer evidence showing a change in policy after a
contract or lock-in relationship has been entered into.25 This interpretation
is drawn from the footnote mentioned previously.26 Also necessary to
withstand summary judgment is evidence of consumers' lack of life cycle
pricing information.27

19. Id. at 473-75 (explaining how information costs create anti-competitive conditions).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., id. at492-93; PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 104 F.3d 811,819-820
(6th Cir. 1997) (describing how accurate information precludes the existence of a distinct
aftermarket that can be controlled by a franchisor).
23. Grimes, supra note 3, at 250-53.
24. Queens City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 441 (3d Cir. 1997)
(stating that the plaintiff's remedy, if one exists, is in contract).
25. See PSI,104 F.3d at 819-20 (discussing information and market definition); Queens City
Pizza, 124 F.3d at 440 (explaining that a unilateral change in policy was crucial to Kodak's holding,

504 U.S. at 451 n.24).
26. Kodak 504 U.S. at 477 n.24.
27. PSI, 104 F.3d at 819-20.
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This approach is Iquestionable given the economic realities of the
franchise relationship. In the aftermath of Kodak and its subsequent
narrowing in the circuit courts, franchisors now may shield themselves
from antitrust liability through broad contractual language in franchise
agreements. This language may include terms that allow franchisors to
designate or change suppliers for franchisees and create rebate systems
that: reward loyalty, compel franchisees to purchase certain equipment
(especially if the franchisor gets a rebate from the supplier), or allow
franchisors to change prices for goods or services.29 These kinds of
provisions, while giving franchisors antitrust shelter, actually exacerbate
the life cycle information barriers and discrimination that were central to
the Supreme Court's rationale in Kodak.3"
For example, a franchisee may regard such provisions as reasonable at
the time of signing without any knowledge of their potential for abuse.3
Moreover, given the state of the law, franchisors would be foolish not to
include such broad provisions, thus limiting the number of franchise
opportunities with more favorable terms available to investors. A narrow
reading of Kodak assumes that unfavorable terms in franchising
agreements will lead to fewer abusive franchise relationships. But this
reading ignores the reality that franchising's economic benefits, combined
with entrepreneurial zeal and faith, will tend to provide franchisors with a
steady supply of franchisees. Only after a franchise agreement has been
signed in good faith is the franchisee faced with rising prices and limited
suppliers, something that an entrepreneur could not have anticipated at the
time of signing the franchise agreement.
This leads to the conclusion that in the United States, without a postsale change in policy, a firm is protected from lock-in antitrust violations
so long as it does not actively conceal its relational market power from
consumers before it franchises its business model. If a firm passively
allows its costumers to discover its life cycle pricing, any barriers to that
kind of discovery can be attributed to market imperfections.32
Furthermore, the relevant market for antitrust inquiry is generally based
on the reasonable availability of substitutes for consumers in a given
28. See Warren S. Grimes, Antitrust and the Systemic Bias Against Small Business: Kodak,
Strategic Conduct, and Leverage Theory, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 231, 249-50 (2001); Grimes,
supra note 3, at 253-58.
29. Grimes, supra note 28, at 249; Grimes, supra note 3, at 252.
30. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 477-78.
31. Grimes, supra note 3, at 258 (arguing that life cycle information barriers are higher for

franchisees than for durable goods consumers).
32. PSI, 104 F.3d at 820 (stating that market imperfections alone can create information

costs).
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market.33 The formulation has a geographic element as well, but the
primary determinant is a market's elasticity.34 If a firm can raise prices
substantially and not lose customers to similar or sufficiently
interchangeable products, then that firm has market power." In such a
situation, the relevant market is solely the firm's products because
customers would presumably substitute other, more competitively priced
goods in response to supra-competitive prices. But American courts have
been reluctant to adopt a franchise relationship as a relevant market, even

though a franchisee is contractually limited in its choice of reasonable
alternatives.36
Article 85 of the Treaty establishing the European Economic
Community regulates the terms of franchise agreements for the European
Union.37 Unlike current U.S. circuit court case law, the European approach
is founded upon balancing price competition with the preservation of
franchisors' reputation and business model.3" This emphasis on fairness is
paternalistic. It assumes that franchise investors lack life cycle pricing
information and are incapable of punishing abusive franchisors in the
primary market.39 But this approach also recognizes that markets can
behave imperfectly and that a franchise relationship gives a franchisor the
opportunity to abuse its dealers and inflate its profits without risking its
own capital.'
The EU regulations also presume that a single firm's products can
compose a relevant market for antitrust inquiry.4 Accordingly, the
33. See, e.g., Kodak, 504 U.S. at 469-70 n.15.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. Sherman Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2005). The Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1,
makes illegal contracts in restraint of trade. Thus franchise plaintiffs may claim that abusive
franchise contracts, by limiting their competitive alternatives, without some economic justification
beyond the exclusion of competitors, is a violation. Id.; Grimes, supra note 3, at 257, 272-75.
37. EEC Treaty art. 85; Commission Regulation No. 4087/88, supra note 1.
38. Commission Regulation No. 4087/88, supra note 1.
39. See Herbert Hovenkamp, PostChicagoAntitrust: A Review and Critique,2001 COLUM.
Bus. L. REv. 257, 283-92 (2001). The author suggests that Kodak rests on untenable logic.
Hovenkamp posits that markets will discipline unruly durable goods producers, and that part of the
economics based approach to antitrust, or Chicago School, is the belief that customers are informed
enough to make rational decisions.
40. Grimes, supranote 3, at 257, 272-75 (suggesting case law allows franchisors to employ
broad contract language to enable abusive behavior against franchisees).
41. EEC Treaty art. 85; Commission Regulation No. 4087/88, supranote 1. Case T-203/01,
Manufacture Francaise des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission, 2003 E.C.R. 00000 (2003)
(finding fines imposed upon an abusive tire manufacturer for anti-competitive behavior were
appropriate); Case T-219/99, British Airways plc v. Comm'n of the European Cmtys., 2003 E.C.R.
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regulations require franchisors to permit franchisees to buy products
(which are the subject of the franchise) from other franchisees.42 Also,
Article 85 requires that franchisors must acquiesce to suppliers nominated
by a franchisee.43 A franchisor may only refuse if the franchisee's use of
the third party supplier would endanger the franchisor's intellectual
property or reputation.' The underlying policy is that franchisees remain
independent businesses; they are entitled to determine prices and compete
on price, at least within the area of the franchise, without undue influence
from a franchisor.45
This attempt at restraining the temptation for abuse that lurks in all
franchise agreements has found expression in recent EU case law.s In Case
T-203/01, Manufacture Francaise des Pneumatiques Michelin v.
Commission, 2003 E.C.R. 00000 (2003), the European Court of Justice
(ECJ) affirmed sanctions levied against a tire manufacturer. 47 That case
addressed abuses undertaken by a fnm that already had market power in a
primary market. 4' However, a particular aspect of Michelin's behavior
prompted the ECJ to look to regulations governing franchise contracts.49
Michelin established amongst its highest volume dealers a "Friends
Club."5' Members of the Club received higher rebates, but faced increased
obligations to Michelin."' Among these was an obligation to disclose
detailed information regarding sales.
00000 (2003) (concluding that for purposes of an EEC Treaty art. 85 inquiry, travel agencies

constituted the relevant market).
42. Commission Regulation No. 4087/88, supra note 1. See Case C-269/95, Francesco
Benincasa v. Dentalkit Srl., 1997 E.C.R. 1-3767, IN26-31 (1997) (describing the franchise
relationship).
43. Commission Regulation No. 4087/88, supra note 1.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Case T-203/01, Michelin v. Commission, 2003 E.C.R. 00000 (2003) (addressing an
unlawful rebate system); Case T-219/99, British Airwaysplc, 2003 E.C.R. at 00000 (determining

whether travel agencies comprise a relevant market).
47. Case T-203/1, Michelin, 2003 E.C.R. at 00000. These fines were imposed because,
among other violations, the tire manufacturer employed a loyalty-inducing rebate system that
rewarded higher sales, but was not motivated by economic forces, like economies of scale. Rather,
the annual rebate system increased dealer purchases from the manufacturer based on reaching
higher tiers of reward, not on the merits ofMichelin's products in relation to competitors' products.
Furthermore, Michelin subjectively varied the levels of certain rebates between years; dealers had
no way of knowing the real cost of tires at the time of purchase. Dealers also faced the prospect of
retaliation from Michelin if they refused to take steps that increased Michelin's market share.

48. Id.
49. Id.

50. Id.
51. Id.
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The ECJ found that this disclosure requirement at odds with Article
85.52 Rather, the EU regulations allow a franchisor to oblige a dealer only
to reveal its "experience gained" as a franchisee.53 Anything resembling an
obligation to disclose prices, sales, or inventory information would
contravene the regulation's prohibition against franchisor price control.'
This underscores another fundamental difference in approach to franchise
agreements; a difference reflected in American case law. 5 Firms abuse
franchisees under the aegis of contract, relying surreptitiously on primary
market information imperfections. Competitors can and would fill56this role,
but they are prevented by contracts they are not even a party to.

IV. CONCLUSION

The issue is whether firms should be able to tack on their inefficient or
abusive operations to every relation specific transaction, without letting a
competitor into the post-contract market. Perhaps franchisors should own
first refusal on all franchisee transactions by virtue of their business model
and reputation. But a competitor who can do something more efficiently
should not be excluded in a competitive market.
A proper solution is to give franchisees the option to find a better
alternative in relational transactions, but only within the existing network
of other franchisees and authorized suppliers. This should only happen if
contract terms are vague and information on pricing is scarce at the time
of signing. If a firm wants to sell a franchise that includes post-contract
transactions or services, it should be able to, provided it accurately
discloses its policies.
However, the EU legislative approach is too intrusive into the
contractual relationship. Such market interventionism, while procompetitive in its sentiment, denies parties the ability to form partnerships
that suit their particular needs. A franchisee may wish for a franchisor to
set prices or monitor sales closely.
Instead of the two current rubrics for evaluating franchise relationships,
U.S. courts should embrace the approach the U.S. Supreme Court

52. Case T-203/1 Michelin, 2003 E.C.R. at 00000.
53. Commission Regulation No. 4087/88, supra note 1.
54. Id.
55. See, e.g., Queens City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 124 F.3d 430, 441 (3d Cir.
1997) (finding a franchise agreement's broad language sufficient to shield franchisor from antitrust
liability, despite franchisor charging supra-competitive prices).
56. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2005); see also Grimes, supra note 3, at 273-74 (stating that the
Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2005), imposes limitations on the freedom of contract).
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employed in Kodak." U.S. Courts should look at the totality of the
circumstances surrounded alleged relational market power abuses rather
than dismiss them as economically impossible.5 8 Empirical evidence
showing that a firm can impose supra-competitive prices without fear of
retribution in a primary market alone should suffice to withstand summary
judgment.5 9 Cases should not be dismissed because a firm enables anticompetitive behavior through broad contract language that lets the firm
raise prices outside the restraints of a competitive market.

57. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
58. See, e.g., SMS Sys. Maint. Servs., Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 188 F.3d 11, 17 (1st Cir.
1999) (rejecting an aftermarket as the relevant market); PSI Repair Servs., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,
104 F.3d 811, 819-20 (6th Cir. 1997) (requiring a change in policy to establish the exertion of
market power), Queens City Pizza, 124 F.3d at 441 (rejecting a relevant market consisting of a
single brand).
59. Kodak, 504 U.S. at 467 (emphasizing a case-by-case approach in lieu of "legal
presumptions that rest on formalistic distinctions rather than actual market realities").
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